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PRO-BUSINESS BUT ANTI-ECONOMY?: WHY
IRELAND’S STAUNCH PROTECTION OF ITS
CORPORATE TAX REGIME IS PREVENTING A
CELTIC PHOENIX FROM RISING FROM THE
ASHES OF THE CELTIC TIGER
Success breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure . . . . As a previous
financial crisis recedes in time, it is quite natural for central bankers,
government officials, bankers, businessmen, and even economists to
believe that a new era has arrived. Cassandra-like warnings that nothing
basic has changed, that there is a financial breaking point that will lead to
a deep depression, are naturally ignored in these circumstances.1

INTRODUCTION
This seemingly self-evident statement from Hyman Minsky’s seminal
work, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, represents a perfect illustration of
the recent history of the Irish economy. Having finally begun to extricate
itself from the abyss of its most recent economic meltdown, the likelihood
still exists for Ireland that current policy decisions couched in past
successes may lead to history repeating itself in the form of a future
economic downturn. This Note will examine Ireland’s questionable
decision—in the wake of one of the worst global and domestic recessions in
history—to double down on a staunch commitment to a business-friendly
corporate tax system, which previously led to the Celtic Tiger era of
economic prosperity beginning in the mid-1990s.2
More than five years after the Irish economy first began to crumble in
late-2008, Ireland is still coming to grips with a soaring sovereign debt
crisis that required an €85 billion financial support lifeline in 2010.3 Despite
dogged and continuous austerity measures implemented to combat the debt
crisis,4 the current debt-to-GDP ratio in Ireland still hovers near 120
1. HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 213 (1986).
2. See Steven Pearlstein, Can Ireland’s Celtic Tiger Roar Again?, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,

2013, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-16/business/41416346_1_celtictiger-u-s-economy-global-credit-bubble (describing (1) the core policy decisions that led to the
initial Celtic Tiger boom; (2) the factors that ultimately led to the collapse of the Irish economy in
2007; and (3) how the current Irish economic system has redoubled its efforts to attract foreign
direct investment (FDI) at the expense of greater domestic development).
3. The Irish bailout package was jointly sponsored by the European Union (EU) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) through a vehicle known as the European Financial Stability
Fund (EFSF). Lisa O’Carroll, Ireland Bailout: Full Irish Government Statement, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov.
28,
2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/ireland-business-blog-with-lisaocarroll/2010/nov/28/ireland-bailout-full-government-statement.
4. Austerity is a fiscal policy strategy that strives to increase an economically stagnant
nation’s competitiveness through across-the-board cuts to public spending and deflation of public
wages in an attempt to reduce sovereign indebtedness and deficits. Mark Blyth, The Austerity
Delusion: Why a Bad Idea Won Over the West, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 41, 41 (2013). For a more in
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percent.5 Throughout it all, an across the board hike to the pro-business
corporate tax rate has not been considered as a policy alternative for
stimulating government revenue and scaling back sovereign debt levels.6
This Note will be broken up into four primary sections in order to better
understand the Irish corporate tax structure and the delicate role it occupies
between providing an engine for economic recovery and depriving the
government of an untapped source of revenue. First, Part I of the Note will
briefly review Ireland’s economic history, beginning with its independence
in 1921 and continuing through the recent global financial crisis and
Ireland’s subsequent efforts toward recovery. Part II will analyze and
explain the details of the Irish corporate tax structure. Specifically, this Part
will outline how Ireland has employed the corporate tax system to attract
investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) as well as how the
various MNCs have employed the Irish corporation tax in order to minimize
their tax obligations both in Ireland and abroad. Following discussion on
the Irish corporate tax structure, Part III will proffer the arguments both for
and against amending the corporate tax as a means of increasing
government revenues. Finally, Part IV will (1) assess the benefits that
would be gained by raising the corporate tax rate, and (2) suggest further
tax-related policies that could be implemented in order to strengthen
Ireland’s overall economic recovery.

depth analysis of the austerity decisions of post-recession Eurozone nations as well as a critique of
those decisions, see generally id.
5. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: IRELAND 6–7
(2013) (citing the 2013 debt-to-GDP ratio as 123.1 percent); see also Irish GDP Revision Eases
Debt Target, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28146603
(highlighting Ireland’s recalculated GDP figures as per EU rules allowing for the inclusion of
research and development costs and gains from illegal activities, which resulted in a revised
estimated debt-to-GDP ratio of 116 percent in 2014).
6. Liz Alderman, Much Fiscal Pain in Ireland, but Low Corporate Taxes Go Untouched,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2010, at B1 (emphasizing that austerity measures imposed by the Irish
government in the wake of the EU-IMF financial bailout included a decrease in the national
minimum wage and an increase in property tax rates while the low corporate tax remained
untouched).
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I. IRISH ECONOMIC HISTORY7
Since declaring its independence in 1921, Ireland has gone through four
major eras that have shaped its economic narrative to date: (1) 1922–1972,
post-independence, a period marked by protectionist policies and lagging
industrialization; (2) 1972–1987, notable for Ireland’s admission into the
European Economic Community (EEC), which subsequently provided
substantial fiscal and trade benefits, but was also marked by continuing
struggles in domestic economic development; (3) 1987–2007, the period
that came to be known as the Celtic Tiger, in which deregulation and an
emphasis on foreign investment led to an enviable economic boom; and (4)
2008–Present, the era in which multiple factors, both internal and external,
coalesced to create a four-pronged economic crisis set into motion by the
crash of the Irish property market bubble.8 The following overview will
describe these eras in greater detail and provide a broad basis for how
Ireland’s economy is currently structured.9
A. 1922–1972: INDEPENDENCE TO ADMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
At the time Ireland asserted its independence from the United Kingdom,
its economy was primarily insular, agrarian, and heavily dependent on the
British market.10 In an effort to diminish its reliance on the United
Kingdom, protectionist measures, specifically the Control Manufactures
7. While Ireland’s economic history has been diverse since first claiming independence from
the United Kingdom, there is oftentimes a common theme of defeatism and overreliance that is
embraced by Irish socioeconomic theorists. One such individual, Cathal Guiomard, stated:
[T]he obstacles to Irish success “go far beyond questions of economic policy and right
to the heart of [Irish] culture; they include some of [Ireland’s] old and cherished ways.
To achieve economic and social modernization, [Ireland] must, for instance, throw off
[its] ruinous defeatism and negativity, [its] anti-intellectualism, [its] tolerance of
mediocrity, [its] inclination towards dependency, and [its] never-ending demand for
subsidies (from London, from Dublin, from Brussels, from anywhere!).”
Sara Dillon, Anglo-Saxon/Celtic/Global: The Tax-Driven Tale of Ireland in the European Union,
36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 48 n.241 (2010).
8. For a more detailed review of Irish economic history, see generally DONAL DONOVAN &
ANTOIN E. MURPHY, THE FALL OF THE CELTIC TIGER 19–29 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
9. In order to have sufficient context for the forthcoming review of Irish economic history, it
is important to have a cursory understanding of the Irish political system. Ireland is a
parliamentary democracy with a bicameral Parliament (Oireachtas) consisting of the upper house
Senate (Seanad Eireann) and the lower house (Dail Eireann). It has a largely ceremonial President
(Michael D. Higgins) that is elected to seven-year terms and can seek reelection once. The Prime
Minister (Taoiseach) (Enda Kenny) acts as the Head of State and is appointed by the President
following nomination by the Dail Eireann. Ireland also has a multi-tiered judicial system with a
Supreme Court (court of last resort) composed of seven judges. See The World Factbook, Ireland,
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldCENT.
factbook/geos/ei.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
10. Sean Dorgan, How Ireland Became the Celtic Tiger, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 23, 2006),
at 2, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/worldwidefreedom/bg1945.cfm.
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Acts, were enacted and ultimately led to the aptly named “Economic War”
with the United Kingdom.11 From 1932–1938, the period in which the
Economic War waged on in earnest, Irish industrial and agricultural exports
fell by one-third and nearly one-half, respectively.12 Ireland’s protectionist
policies led to a lack of capital investment from both foreign and domestic
sources, and ultimately resulted in recession and net emigration.13 Most
gallingly, however, was the fact that Ireland’s European neighbors were
simultaneously enjoying dramatic post-war economic booms.14
Ireland finally abolished the Control Manufactures Acts in 1957.15 The
following year proved to be even more significant, as Finance Secretary Dr.
T.K. Whitaker’s seminal report, Economic Development, marked a radical
change in course away from the former protectionist policies and toward a
more open economy emphasizing freer trade and greater foreign
investment.16 The drastic overhaul to the Irish economic system led to some
significant short-term improvements,17 but the long-term results of decades
of high unemployment and stagnant growth led to a prolonged lag period.18
As a result, Irish industry remained underdeveloped while Irish workers
continued to seek opportunities abroad, especially since the newly minted
free trade policies had rendered the few successful domestic companies
uncompetitive.19 Nevertheless, the economic tides were slowly turning, and
11. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 20. One of the most prominent examples of this
period of protectionism was the Control Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934, which prohibited
majority ownership of Irish industry by foreign entities and resulted in virtually no foreign
investment in Ireland’s would-be industrialization process. The effects of the Control
Manufactures Acts on capital investment was further exacerbated by the prevalent outflow of Irish
capital primarily through the investment by Irish banks in more attractive foreign assets,
particularly British government securities. That Ireland was guarding against foreign control over
its domestic economy by restricting foreign capital investment while the gatekeepers of the
economy—the Irish banks—were pouring capital from Ireland into those very same foreign
economies is rich in irony.
12. Meredith J. Coleman, Comment, The Republic of Ireland’s Economic Boom: Can the
Emerald Isle Sustain Its Exponential Growth, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 833, 836 (2000).
13. By the 1950s, approximately 400,000 people had emigrated from Ireland over the course
of a decade. That figure constituted nearly 15 percent of the entire population of Ireland. Dorgan,
supra note 10, at 2.
14. See DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 20.
15. Id.
16. Significantly, Dr. Whitaker’s report emphasized a policy shift toward “the encouragement
of foreign capital with tax concessions and other incentives,” a prescient precursor to the
development of the current Irish corporate tax regime and its emphasis on attracting FDI. See id.
17. See Dorgan, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that the Irish GDP grew at an average annual rate
of 4.2 percent over the course of the 1960s).
18. Despite the increasing openness of the Irish economy beginning in the 1960s, “Ireland still
depended heavily on agriculture, which had low output and income levels, and the migration of
people from the land was greater than job creation in new businesses. As a result, there was no net
increase in employment in the 1960s, and net emigration from the country continued . . . .” Id.
19. Id.; see also James Croke, Comment, Chuaigh Ár Lá - Debt of a Gaelsman: Ireland’s
Sovereign Debt Crisis, National and International Responses, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 365, 369
(2012) (citing three main factors as evidence of the underdevelopment of the Irish economy
during the period immediately succeeding the protectionist era: (1) high unemployment (peaking
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with the establishment of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) in
1970, the signs pointed to a new and substantial dedication to a more open
economic regime.20
B. 1972–1987: EUROPEANIZATION OF THE IRISH ECONOMY21
The first stirrings of tangible changes in the Irish economy22 occurred
upon Ireland’s admission to the EEC in 1972.23 Upon its admission, Ireland
expertly availed itself of two primary benefits of membership in the EEC:
(1) the availability of structural and cohesion funds;24 and (2) unhindered
access to the European marketplace.25 Ireland skillfully parlayed these
benefits into tangible economic improvement while simultaneously
eschewing some of the social contract components that are normally strictly
required conditions of EU membership.26
More specifically, despite the obvious economic advantages resulting
from EEC membership, Ireland was reluctant “to accept the other part of
the ‘deal’ with Europe, namely, adoption of a low inflationary profile and
at 17 percent in 1986); (2) high levels of public debt (reaching as high as 125 percent of GNP in
1987); and (3) mass and continual emigration to the United Kingdom and United States).
20. See Dorgan, supra note 10, at 5 (providing the stated purpose of the IDA as seeking out
and attracting MNCs engaged in modern and sustainable industry and describing its methods as
employing a “pragmatic, business-like, focused marketing method. The key decision was to focus
on companies that represented the future—high technology, high output, and high skills. The main
targets included the computer industry, pharmaceuticals, and medical technology, followed by
international services.”). For further information on the IDA and its current mission and methods,
see generally IDA IRELAND, http://www.idaireland.us/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
21. For a more in depth analysis of Ireland’s paradoxical role in the EU, see generally Dillon,
supra note 7.
22. For example, the EEC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) guaranteed prices for the sale
of certain agricultural products in the EEC-zone, thus providing immediate and much-needed
access to the Eurozone countries for the ailing Irish agricultural sector. DONOVAN & MURPHY,
supra note 8, at 23.
23. Dillon, supra note 7, at 1 n.1. Pursuant to the Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland,
Norway, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland, Ireland became a member of the European
Economic Community.
24. Although the Community Support Framework (CSF) that included the structural fund
provisions was not adopted until 1988, Ireland has since used these substantial funds (estimated to
compose between 2% to 4% of the Irish GDP) to fund public investment projects that may have
otherwise been cut or underfunded due to domestic fiscal constraints. Furthermore, Ireland has
additionally benefitted from the CSF due to its classification as a “periphery” or “cohesion”
country, such that “EU law permits Ireland to give more generous grant aid [75% of the total
capital investment] to corporations . . . interested in moving to Ireland, [while] most other EU
member countries may only offer 20%.” Coleman, supra note 12, at 840.
25. See id. at 841 (“As part of the European Union, Ireland is able to automatically avail itself
of a variety of markets and trading partners, both in the United States and throughout Europe.”).
26. See generally Dillon, supra note 7, at 13–26 (discussing how Ireland often feigned
eagerness in participating in the European “ideal” while really engaging in purely self-interested
actions such as exploitation of the structural fund structure and highly protected tax competition.
These self-interested actions were accepted by the European establishment because of Ireland’s
role on the periphery of Europe and its past relationship with the United Kingdom, which was
seen as somewhat of a rival to the EEC at large).
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stronger fiscal discipline.”27 In spite of its disharmonious participation
within the larger European context, Ireland’s largely individualized policies
went substantially unchecked for the first several decades of its
membership, and thus, Ireland was able to carve out a markedly selfinterested niche in Europe.28 However, Ireland’s policy decisions ultimately
led to high inflation, a return of net emigration, and skyrocketing sovereign
debt.29 Finally, Irish public expenditure strategies compounded themselves
into a full-blown economic crisis wherein annual inflation from 1981 to
1986 averaged approximately 11 percent, the debt-to-GDP ratio ballooned
to 120 percent, and unemployment reached 15 percent by 1985.30 Instead of
progressing, Ireland had reverted to the dark economic era of the 1950s, and
it was clear by 1986 that something drastic had to be done. Fortunately,
Ireland’s emphasis on a more liberalized economic approach, combined
with the benefits it enjoyed as an EU member nation, were the sown seeds
that ultimately blossomed into the significant economic expansion of the
Celtic Tiger years.31
C. 1987–2007: RETRENCHMENT, DEREGULATION, AND THE
ROARING CELTIC TIGER
Despite the bleak economic conditions of the early 1980s, those years
proved to be beneficial in that they finally spurred the Irish government to
take significant reformatory action. Fianna Fáil, a center-right leaning party
responsible for a rash of fiscal abuses during the preceding decades,
shocked even its own supporters when, upon election to the government in
1987, it performed a political U-turn and implemented a program of severe
public expenditure cuts on both labor and investment.32 Reducing public
27. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 23.
28. The issue of Ireland’s role in the context of the EU is a common topic, such that one

commentator has said:

Irish policy toward the EU was dominated by the desire to maximize receipts from EC
[European Community] funds, while minimizing the amount of interference in
domestic policy (in the application of funds, competition policy and other areas) and
seeking derogations on difficult parts. The Irish approach was to ask what Brussels
could do for the Irish economy rather than the reverse.
Dillon, supra note 7, at 9 n.32.
29. While EU rules generally mandated strict fiscal policy choices by its member states,
Ireland went on a spree of public spending in order to improve domestic infrastructure and social
welfare programs as well as to combat rising unemployment (one-third of the Irish workforce was
made up of public sector jobs by 1980). See Dorgan, supra note 10, at 6.
30. Id. at 3.
31. See Pearlstein, supra note 2 (citing Ireland’s “heavily subsidized entry into the [EU]”
along with its low corporate tax rate and use of targeted incentives as the primary factors leading
to its economic expansion beginning in the late 1980s).
32. Dorgan, supra note 10, at 7; see also DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 22 (noting
that even in campaigning against the previous Fine Gael/Labour coalition leading up to the 1987
election, the Fianna Fáil party pledged to substantially increase public expenditure, only to renege
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expenditure in order to improve financial stability, also known as
retrenchment,33 played a critical role in revitalizing the Irish economy.34
However, myriad internal and external factors also came together
fortuitously in the early 1990s and ultimately contributed to the
forthcoming economic boom years.35 Post-retrenchment, internal factors,
such as Ireland’s highly educated workforce, the influence of the IDA, and
the business-friendly tax structure, blended seamlessly with external
factors, such as the availability of EU funding and marketplace and the
advancement of global information technology.36 When combined, these
factors provided a perfect climate for Ireland’s explosive economic
growth.37
While Ireland was one of the poorest nations in the Eurozone upon
admission into the EEC, by 2001 Irish workers’ wages exceeded the EU
average, and by 2007 they were second only to Luxembourg.38 By the
beginning of the 21st century, Irish economic growth had reversed the
centuries long tradition of net emigration while also creating a fiscal surplus
of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2000 and lowering the overall debt-to-GDP ratio
to a meager 38 percent by 2001.39 Almost overnight, Ireland had become an
economic powerhouse relative to its size and a symbol of the global
economy.40 However, by 2001 the Irish economy also began to show signs
of slowing down.41 As foreign direct investments (FDI) began to dry up,42
Irish fiscal policy decisions increasingly turned to the domestic housing
on its campaign promise and pledge to adhere to a scheme of drastic fiscal cutbacks once elected
to office).
33. Retrenchment,
COLLINS
DICTIONARY,
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/retrenchment (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
34. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 22.
35. See generally Coleman, supra note 12, at 837–45 (defining external factors as those
without the immediate control of the Irish government, whereas internal factors were within the
ambit of its control).
36. Id. (noting specifically Ireland’s access to (1) EU “structural funds,” i.e., grants from the
European Community Support Framework (CSF) beginning in 1989, which provided significant
funding for economic stabilization through infrastructural and development projects; and (2) the
Single European Market (SEM), which opened up previously untapped trade markets across
Europe and increased Ireland’s appeal to American companies looking for greater access to the
SEM).
37. See Croke, supra note 19, at 370.
38. Id. at 370–71.
39. Patrick Honohan & Brendan Walsh, Catching Up With The Leaders: The Irish Hare, 33
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, no. 1, 2002, at 1, 8, 11.
40. At its peak in 2000, Ireland was often considered the most “open” economy in the world, a
title exemplified by the fact that Ireland’s trade-to-GDP ratio (i.e., its exports plus imports as a
percentage of overall GDP) was a startling 173 per cent. Id. at 39.
41. See Pearlstein, supra note 2.
42. Croke, supra note 19, at 375 (providing as evidence of the slowdown the fact that although
the original Celtic Tiger attracted FDI through the low corporate tax rate and competitive labor
costs, Irish wages began to “rapidly outpace GDP growth” beginning in 2001, and by 2007, FDI in
Ireland accounted for only 5 percent of such investment in the Eurozone, as compared to 15
percent of all such investment in 2001).
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market in order to sustain the boom, a move that ultimately proved
disastrous.43
D. 2007–PRESENT: POPPING THE PROPERTY MARKET BUBBLE,
THE RESULTANT SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS, AND THE
WHIMPERING CELTIC TIGER
1. Foundations of economic collapse
Although numerous external factors helped contribute to the crash of
the Irish economy, in reality “Ireland’s economic condition was actually a
house of cards vulnerable to any gust of wind.”44 Despite the Irish
economy’s great success story at the turn of the 21st century, Ireland
“began to lose its way” after the tech bubble burst in 2001 and the
vulnerabilities of the Irish economic model were first exposed.45 In the end,
a weakening in demand for Irish exports due to the global economic
slowdown was the first contributing factor in Ireland’s economic
downturn.46
As the pattern of export-led growth gradually diminished and
disappeared,47 Irish policy makers ignored the signs hinting at a broader
weakening of the economy, and instead focused on maintaining the
previous high growth rates at all costs.48 Rather than using the opportunity
to reboot and strengthen the foundations of the economy through a more
sustainable growth model,49 Ireland instead became heavily reliant on
43. See Pearlstein, supra note 2 (“At its peak, this real estate frenzy probably accounted for 25
percent of the economy’s output and employment and generated a third of the government’s tax
revenue.”).
44. Croke, supra note 19, at 372.
45. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
46. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that the collapse of the Dot.com bubble
in 2000 and the outbreak of the war in Iraq in 2001 were key exogenous factors that ultimately led
to the weakening of the world economy and thereby contributed to the markedly slower rate of
demand for Irish exports).
47. Croke, supra note 19, at 375 (demonstrating that “between 2001 and 2007, [FDI] in
Ireland declined dramatically from just under 15% of Eurozone FDI in 2001 to just over 5% in
2007.”).
48. One commentator cited the “failure [of the Irish government] to responsibly manage
budgetary surpluses during the period of rapid economic expansion,” and more specifically, the
explosive increase in social welfare spending coupled with drastic tax cuts around the turn of the
21st century, as examples of the errors made by Irish policymakers around this time. Instead of
acknowledging the signs of an economic slowdown and determining stable, long-term solutions,
the Irish government was blinded in its attempt to maintain the status quo of booming economic
growth, and thus, chose an ill-advised course of economic policymaking. See id. at 373–74.
49. Some economists argue that while the emphasis on domestic demand, specifically in the
construction sector, was misguided and used to prop up high growth rates in a progressively
decaying economy, the overall “inward” focus would have been better served by developing the
domestic industries that had lagged significantly behind due to the dominance of foreign MNCs in
the Irish economic domain. In focusing on promoting the growth and viability of homegrown
industries and companies, the Irish government may have been able to foster an economic
development plan that promoted growth, albeit at a slower pace, while capitalizing on the
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domestic demand, specifically in the construction and housing markets.50
This overreliance on domestic demand was further exacerbated by the Irish
banking system’s emphasis on “innovative” lending practices implemented
to capitalize on the property boom.51 The new lending practices required
Irish banks to seek out capital from foreign lenders in order to bridge the
gap between domestic deposits and lending obligations, which only served
to further distort the sustainability of the market bubble.52 Furthermore, the
Irish government simultaneously embarked on a wildly reckless course of
fiscal policymaking in which public spending increased dramatically while
income taxes were repeatedly cut.53 “In the 2007 budget alone, the
government increased social welfare spending by €973 million ($1.35
billion) and cut taxes by €501 million ($695 million).”54
2. Property market bubble bursts55
The decisions and excesses of the first years of the 21st century led to a
hyper-inflated credit bubble. The situation was only exacerbated by the
decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) to maintain artificially
depressed interest rates in order to spur growth in the stagnant continental
economies even while Ireland was beginning to boom.56 Irish banks began
to become exceedingly more leveraged as they sought out new sources of
capital in order to finance the never-ending demand to sustain domestic
growth through the demand for property.57 At its peak, the Irish housing
infrastructural, developmental, and entrepreneurial fruits sown by the FDI made by all the Irelandbased MNCs. See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 2.
50. See Croke, supra note 19, at 375 (discussing how by 2007 approximately 20% of the Irish
GDP and 12% of the Irish workforce were drawn from construction).
51. See generally DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 70–75. The progression of the Irish
property market bubble may be analyzed in the context of Hyman Minsky’s three-step progression
in asset bubble financing: (1) hedge financing; (2) speculative financing; and (3) Ponzi financing.
Whereas hedge financing (i.e., prudent lending to well-vetted borrowers) characterized the early
stages of the Celtic Tiger boom, mortgage financing became increasingly speculative as the driver
of the economic growth in Ireland shifted from exports to the property market. Ultimately, a
“Ponzi financing” system took root, typified by a lack of significant internal auditing as well as
loans being made with loan to value (LTV) ratios consistently reaching 100%, meaning that
borrowers did not need to provide any funds to procure a loan, and in many cases, were offered
such loans on the basis of the paper value of other properties held by the borrower. For a more in
depth review of Minsky’s asset market bubble analysis, see id. at 45–49.
52. Id. at 77 (stating that “[t]he gap between the banks’ lending and their retail deposits rose
from €26 billion in 2002 to €129 billion by 2008 and was met by wholesale funding, largely from
abroad.”).
53. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
54. Croke, supra note 19, at 373–74 (noting that 2007 was not unique in producing such
figures, as public expenditure exceeded GDP in terms of the respective rates of growth for every
year from 2001 to 2008).
55. For an excellent and in depth analysis of the theory of asset market bubbles, particularly in
the context of the Irish housing market bubble, see DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 45–80.
56. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
57. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 77–79.
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sector was constructing 50 percent of the number of houses built during the
same period in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that the United
Kingdom boasted a population approximately fifteen times larger than
Ireland’s.58 Finally, the macroeconomic factors coalesced with the
exceedingly distorted property market to create a crash of epic
proportions.59
3. Banking crisis and government guarantee
As the property market finally collapsed, the overexposure of the Irish
banks to the domestic property market and its foreign-backed funding
became abundantly clear.60 Having fallen into insolvency, the largest Irish
banks experienced some of the most spectacular collapses,61 and despite
various emergency tactics employed, the run on Irish banks at the end of
September 2008 finally required the government to step in to guarantee the
deposits of the banks or risk the entire nation collapsing into bankruptcy.62
“The assets covered by this guarantee amounted to approximately €365
billion ($506 billion), several times the country’s GDP,”63 but when
government revenue decreased precipitously,64 the banking guarantee
ultimately “brought the government itself to the brink [of insolvency].”65
4. EU-IMF bailout and attendant austerity measures
In late November 2010, as the banking and fiscal crises continued to
worsen, Ireland finally agreed to an €85 billion multilateral support package
from its European partners.66 Unlike some of its fellow Eurozone countries

58. Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2011, available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/03/michael-lewis-ireland-201103.
59. Croke, supra note 19, at 377 (referencing a decline in Irish property prices by 7.3% in
2007 and an additional 9.1% in 2008—dwarfed by the 16.8% decline for property prices in Dublin
commuter counties—which had a significant impact on Irish banks, some of which had over 60%
of their balance sheets dedicated to domestic property loans).
60. DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 80.
61. “Shares of Anglo Irish Bank, at one time the nation’s third largest lender, were trading at
€18 ($25) per share in May 2008. Eighteen months later, they were trading at 1% of that value.”
Croke, supra note 19, at 377.
62. The guarantee ultimately covered the deposits at the six largest Irish banks as well as “all
money borrowed by Irish banks from other financial institutions.” Banking Guarantee Bolsters
Irish Market, RTÉ NEWS (Sept. 30, 2008), www.rte.ie/news/2008/0930/108605-economy/.
63. Croke, supra note 19, at 379–80.
64. The resultant fiscal crisis was caused by an over-reliance on property taxes (e.g., stamp
duties, VAT, direct real property taxes, etc.) and a sudden boom in social expenditure demands as
unemployment and other social welfare programs were taxed to their limit. See DONOVAN &
MURPHY, supra note 8, at 8.
65. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
66. The European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) (€22.5 billion) and the European Financial
Stability Mechanism (EFSM) (€22.5 billion)—both constructs of the ECB—as well as the IMF
(€22.5 billion) and contributions from bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Denmark contributed €67.5 billion to the support package. In order to cover the difference up
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that required a bailout due to excessive public spending (e.g., Greece),67
Ireland reached the precipice of economic disaster because of the
aforementioned government guarantee of the six primary Irish banks.68 The
interest rate on the bailout loan was determined to be 5.8 percent per annum
baseline and thereafter variable depending both upon the timing of the
withdrawals from the bailout fund, as well as upon the prevailing market
conditions.69
Despite the extension of the emergency bailout program from its
Eurozone partners, Ireland also undertook expansive austerity measures in a
simultaneous effort to get its own financial house in order.70 At the time of
the bailout, Irish policy makers set forth a plan to cut public expenditure by
€10 billion and increase tax receipts by €5 billion over a four-year period.71
Required by the European lenders as a condition to the bailout program,
these austerity measures were largely undertaken in order to corral Ireland’s
spiraling budget deficit.72 After years of budget surpluses during the Celtic
Tiger era, the deficit in Ireland had risen above 30 percent of GDP at the
time of the multilateral bailout.73
5. Beginnings of recovery
While the Irish economy has begun to exhibit signs of recovery,74 it is
widely accepted that the current climate in Ireland is a Dickensian “Tale of

to €85 billion, Ireland contributed an additional €17.5 billion drawn primarily from the National
Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF). O’Carroll, supra note 3.
67. To be clear, the fiscal policy decisions of the Fianna Fáil-led government during the first
several years of the 21st century—namely, increasing public expenditure while receiving less in
the way of EU structural and cohesion funds while also consistently cutting income tax rates—
certainly contributed to the overall malaise that struck the Irish economy during the global
economic downturn. Nevertheless, it was the banking guarantee and not these prior fiscal policy
decisions that ultimately proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s (or, in this case, the Celtic
Tiger’s) back. See Croke, supra note 19, at 373–74.
68. See Floyd Norris, In Ireland, Dire Echoes of a Bailout Gone Awry, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2013, at B1.
69. Eurozone Agrees €85 Billion Deal for Ireland, RTÉ NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010),
www.rte.ie/news/2010/1128/294894-economy/.
70. See Croke, supra note 19, at 381–82.
71. Specifically, the proposal outlined by then Taoiseach Brian Cowen included (1) cutting the
national minimum wage from €8.65 per hour to €7.65 per hour; (2) increasing the value-added tax
from 21 to 22 per cent; (3) reducing public-sector jobs by 25,000 positions; (4) diminishing
starting salaries for public-sector jobs by 10 percent; and (5) cutting approximately €3 billion in
social welfare expenditures. Neil Shah, Ireland Outlines Austerity Measures, WALL ST. J., Nov.
25,
2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703572404575634452116491286.
72. Id.
73. See id. (noting that EU member states are required to carry a budget deficit of no greater
than 3 percent of GDP, and that Ireland’s budget deficit at the time of the bailout exceeded ten
times the allowed limitation).
74. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 5, at 6–7 (noting that the debt-toGDP ratio, which had skyrocketed since 2008, has gradually begun to stabilize at approximately
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Two Economies.”75 While FDI has always been a significant component of
the Irish economy in the recent past, investment levels since 2011 have hit
all-time highs as declining currency, wage, and real estate values have
combined with the traditional systemic benefits of doing business in Ireland
(e.g., low corporate tax rate, English-speaking workforce, and harmonious
labor relations) to make Ireland even more attractive for FDI.76 However,
the jobs created by the MNCs account for only 15 percent of the total
workforce,77 and while unemployment remains staggeringly high,78 the rest
of the labor force is dependent on an inefficient domestic economy that
relies heavily on public spending.79 Given that Ireland has implemented
drastic austerity measures to reign in the sovereign debt issues, it is unlikely
that the government can maintain this level of investment while
simultaneously addressing the issues raised by the wanton fiscal policy
decisions that contributed to the current crisis in the first place.80
Despite the circumstances leading to tempered expectations for the
recovery,81 tangible results are finally being seen.82 Most significantly,
Ireland exited the multilateral bailout program in December 2013, almost
three years after its initial implementation.83 In addition, Ireland chose to
exit the bailout program without requesting a “safety net” credit line from
the ECB, a decision based on strong market evidence that confidence in
Irish debt securities had returned to high enough levels that any such

125 percent—specifically 123.1 percent as of 2012—and should start a downward trend in the
short term).
75. See generally Pearlstein, supra note 2 (contrasting the MNC-led, export-driven global
economy akin to the original Celtic Tiger with the “relatively inefficient, unproductive and
uncompetitive” domestic economy).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Ireland’s unemployment rate in 2012 was 14.7 percent, nearly double the 7.9 percent
average unemployment rate for the other 34 nations comprising the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra
note 5, at 6, 17.
79. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
80. See Shah, supra note 71 (providing that while social benefits in Ireland remain fairly high,
continued funding for such programs, when taken together with the drastic austerity measures first
proposed in 2010, could ultimately create an even larger fiscal crisis).
81. For a more detailed analysis of the economic challenges facing Ireland upon its exit from
the EU-IMF bailout in December 2013, see Ireland’s Bail-Out Exit: Dead Cat Bounce, THE
ECONOMIST,
Dec.
15,
2013,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/irish-bailout-exit.
82. See id. (noting that Ireland’s estimated deficit was reduced to a mere 7.3 percent of GDP at
the end of 2013, down from the highs of over 30 percent in 2010); see also Eoin Burke Kennedy,
Unemployment Rate Hits Five-Year Low of 11.5%, IRISH TIMES, July 30, 2014, available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-hits-five-year-low-of-11-51.1882542 (reporting that unemployment was down to 11.5 percent in July 2014).
83. See Henry McDonald, Ireland Becomes the First Country to Exit Eurozone Bailout
Programme,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
13,
2013,
at
44,
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/13/ireland-first-country-exit-eurozone-bailout.
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“safety net” would not be needed going forward.84 Although Irish policy
makers have been quick to point out that the exit from the bailout program
does not imply a fully recovered economy,85 the progress made since
accepting the bailout relief has been encouraging.
II. IRELAND’S CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURE
A. THE 12.5 PERCENT CORPORATE TAX RATE
“The corporate tax is one of the pillars of Ireland’s economy, because it
drives exports and jobs, and creates tax revenues for the government.”86
This statement by Paul Duffy, a vice president of Pfizer in Ireland, is
indicative of the complicated role that the corporate tax structure plays in
the current economic climate of both Ireland and the EU at large.87 It cannot
be questioned that at its peak, Ireland was awash with FDI due substantially
to the attractiveness of the Irish corporate tax regime.88 In concert with the
substantial efforts of the IDA in attracting high-tech MNCs to the Emerald
Isle89 as well as Ireland’s unfettered access to the European marketplace,90
the corporation tax has been the foremost engine in encouraging such
substantial FDI.91 Through these concurrent efforts, Ireland has attracted
numerous MNCs to set up bases in Ireland, including: Dell, Microsoft,
Apple, Google, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Intel, Facebook, and
LinkedIn.92 The benefits enjoyed by these MNCs will be discussed in
further detail in the following section, but given that a company such as
84. Peter Spiegel, Ireland to Exit Three-Year Bailout Without EU Credit Line, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a5ed874-4d23-11e3-9f4000144feabdc0.html#axzz2l76amGMH; see also McDonald, supra note 83 (“Having implemented
the spending cuts, asset sales and reforms required under the bailout, Ireland has been embraced
again by the debt markets that shut out the country at the turn of the decade. It has raised enough
debt independently to fund itself into 2015 and has more than €20bn (£17bn) in the bank.”).
85. Id. (citing Finance Minister Michael Noonan’s warning about the myriad challenges
remaining and stating that “[the bailout exit] is not the end of the road. This is a very significant
milestone in the road.”).
86. Alderman, supra note 6.
87. For a more in depth analysis of the economic motivations of Ireland’s corporate tax
scheme as well as the regional repercussions of those policy decisions within the EU, see
generally Dillon, supra note 7.
88. Id. at 10 n.36 (demonstrating that in 2008 alone, United States MNCs invested almost
$150 billion in Ireland, which amounted to more than the FDI made by United States MNCs in
Brazil, Russia, India and China combined).
89. Coleman, supra note 12, at 843–45.
90. Dillon, supra note 7, at 22–23 (“Ireland did not become genuinely wealthy . . . it merely
pulled in United States investment through a crude and quite obvious mechanism: extremely low
tax. It was the tax/European market intersection that allowed Ireland to lasso such a huge amount
of investment relative to its size.”) (emphasis added).
91. See Alderman, supra note 6 (indicating that MNCs directly employ more than 250,000
people in Ireland and contribute more than half of the corporate tax receipts (in excess of $5
billion) collected by the government annually).
92. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 852–57; see also Alderman, supra note 6.
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Apple was able to save $2.4 billion by conservative estimates in 2011
through its exploitation of the Irish corporate tax structure, it is easy to see
what makes the regime so popular among MNCs.93
Ireland’s corporate tax structure is codified in the Taxes Consolidation
Act of 1997, thereafter amended on a regular basis.94 Specifically, the
current corporate taxation scheme, including the baseline 12.5 percent
corporation tax, was adopted by amendment in 1999.95 Prior to the adoption
of the current tax rate, Ireland employed a special 10 percent tax rate for
corporate income derived from manufacturing activities.96 However, that
system was abolished in favor of the current 12.5 percent across the board
rate due in large part to external pressure from EU member states that
decided to withdraw their original “State Aid approval for the . . . sectoral
tax incentives,” particularly with respect to the manufacturing activities tax
rate.97
Any analysis of the Irish corporation tax begins with this 12.5 percent
overall rate.98 It represents one of the lowest corporate tax rate regimes in
all of Europe99 and is indicative of the attractiveness of the Irish tax regime
for foreign corporations.100 It is important to note that despite accounts of
special deals for certain companies on an individualized basis,101 it is
generally asserted that no such preferential treatment exists under the Irish
93. Charles Duhigg, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at A1.
94. Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (Act No. 39/1997) (Ir.), available at

http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0039/index.html.
95. See
Finance
Act
1999
(Act
No.
2/1999)
(Ir.),
available
at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0002/sec0071.html#sec71 (amending § 21 of the
Taxes Consolidation Act, which originally set the corporate tax rate at 36 percent of corporate
profits, to apply an annually descending rate of corporate tax rates beginning on April 1, 1997,
such that the rates were set at 32 percent for 1998, 28 percent for 1999, 24 percent for 2000, 20
percent for 2001, 16 percent for 2002, and the current 12.5 percent rate for 2003 and every
subsequent year).
96. See generally Coleman, supra note 12, at 845–50.
97. Ireland’s
Corporation
Tax
Strategy,
DEPT.
OF
FIN.,
(2013),
http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/CT-Strategy-Presentation-for-Website-FINAL.pdf.
98. See e.g., Conor O’Brien, Is Ireland’s Corporation Tax Regime Fit for Purpose?, IRISH
TIMES, June 11, 2013, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/is-ireland-scorporation-tax-regime-fit-for-purpose-1.1423602.
99. Vincent Boland, Dublin Ditches Double Irish to Save Low Tax Regime, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
14,
2014,
available
at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/1f740b46-539b-11e4-929b00144feab7de.html#axzz3GQwtAFY3; see also Jim Puzzanghera & Paresh Dave, Ireland to
Close Corporate Tax Loophole Used by Google and Others, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, available
at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ireland-tax-haven-20141015-story.html (“Ireland’s
12.5% rate on corporate income is second only to Switzerland’s 8.5% rate among the world’s
most advanced economies, according to the [OECD].”).
100. In comparison, standard corporation tax rates in France and Germany—the two largest
economies in the EU—are roughly 34 percent. Coleman, supra note 12, at 845.
101. This claim is supported by a 2011 report conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, which
found that the “effective rate of tax on corporate profits in Ireland was 11.9 [percent],” a number
almost identical to the statutory rate of 12.5 percent. Jim Stewart, Corporation Tax: How
Important is the 12.5% Corporate Tax Rate in Ireland, 4 (Inst. for Int’l Integration Studies,
Discussion Paper No. 375, 2011).
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corporate tax structure.102 However, in addition to the 12.5 percent tax rate,
Ireland does provide various tax subsidies for research and development
and other activities.103
Furthermore, unlike the United States’ regime, which defines corporate
tax residence based exclusively on where the company is incorporated,104 a
company is considered a resident of Ireland for the purposes of tax liability
only if the company is managed and controlled in Ireland.105 In other words,
a corporate subsidiary of a large American corporation may be incorporated
in Ireland, but managed and controlled in another tax jurisdiction, such that
it would not be considered a tax resident of Ireland.106 Despite being overly
simplistic, such an entity would not be obligated to pay taxes to the United
States on foreign-earned revenues derived from operations outside of the
United States, nor would it be obligated to pay taxes in Ireland on any
profits not derived from direct operations within Ireland.107 Thus, a nonresident corporate entity may still be subject to Ireland’s corporate tax, but
only to the extent that it carries out activities in Ireland that directly or
indirectly contribute income to the corporation.108 This is the crux of the
system that leads to the commonly debated tax avoidance schemes
employed by the world’s largest MNCs in Ireland.109 However, it is
important to note that Irish policy makers have recently succumbed to

102. O’Brien, supra note 98.
103. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
104. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a)(3), (a)(4) (2012) (defining a corporation as “domestic” if said

corporation is “created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or
of any State”); see also Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects
of the Corporate Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax
Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89, 90 (2012) (describing the “worldwide system of taxation”
employed by the United States whereby corporations “resident” in the United States are subject to
taxation by the United States on all income derived by such corporations on the basis of this
residence, regardless of the source of said income).
105. See O’Brien, supra note 98.
106. It is significant to note that Michael Noonan, the Irish Finance Minister, recently
announced plans to revamp the tax code. Although the government remains steadfastly against
any increase to the baseline corporation tax, one of the main policy changes will be the closing of
the loophole that allows companies incorporated in Ireland to effectively be “stateless” by being
operated outside of Ireland. This residency rule is the crux of many of the tax avoidance schemes
employed by some of the world’s most significant MNCs, and as such, the form and effectiveness
of this policy change will be important to follow over the coming months and years. See Ireland to
Change Company Tax Laws, but 12.5% Corporation Tax Rate to Stay, RTÉ NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.rte.ie/news/business/2013/1015/480547-government-committed-to-12-5-corporationtax-rate/.
107. Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 825, 837 (2012).
108. O’Brien, supra note 98.
109. Id. For further discussion of the details of this process, see infra Section III(B) describing
the mechanics of elaborate tax schemes such as the Irish Double Sandwich, which exploits this
loophole in the Irish corporate tax code in order to minimize the tax liability of large MNCs.
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international pressure by announcing that this corporate residence loophole
will be closed beginning in 2015.110
Nevertheless, the Irish corporate tax structure in the context of the EU
is still a point of significant contention, with European leaders decrying that
the current system amounts to a “beggar thy neighbor” policy that fosters a
harmfully competitive environment.111 EU tax harmonization has long been
a continental policy goal, and although outright standardization of EU tax
rates is unlikely to ever occur due to the national tax sovereignty issues
attendant to any such proposal, other policy alternatives have been
proposed.112 For instance, the European Commission previously proposed a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) to more equitably
distribute corporate tax revenues.113 According to its proponents, the
CCCTB would tax corporate profits across the EU, which “would be
allocated to the participating Member States, based on an apportionment
formula, and then subjected to tax in [each] Member State at the corporate
tax rate applicable in that State.”114
Since the most recent global financial crisis, analysis of sovereign tax
policy in the context of an increasingly globalized and cross-jurisdictional
economic system has become a highly contentious issue.115 Bi- and multilateral tax treaties address some of these issues, but loopholes between the
various programs still provide corporations with ample opportunity to
exploit the systems and minimize their tax liability.116 Specifically,
accusations of profit shifting and transfer pricing manipulation dominate
110. See Boland, supra note 99 (specifying details of the withdrawal of the corporate residence
loophole, including: (1) “all companies [newly] incorporated in Ireland will be deemed resident
[t]here for tax purposes” beginning on January 1, 2015, and thus, will be subject to tax regardless
of where they are managed and controlled; (2) all companies currently incorporated in Ireland and
employing this tax avoidance structure must phase out the practice by 2020; and (3) the headline
12.5 percent corporate tax rate will remain unchanged); see also Stephen Castle & Mark Scott,
Under Fire, Ireland Is Set to Phase Out a Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2014, at B1 (pointing
out that despite the abolishment of the corporate residence loophole, Irish policy makers are
simultaneously proposing a “knowledge development box” program that would tax revenues and
royalties derived from intellectual property at a rate even lower than the headline 12.5 percent
corporate tax rate).
111. Stewart, supra note 101, at 1.
112. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION
AND
PROFIT
SHIFTING
(OECD
Publishing
2013),
available
at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en.
113. ERNST & YOUNG, COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE: A STUDY ON THE
IMPACT OF THE COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN
BUSINESS TAXPAYERS 7 (2011), available at http://taxinstitute.ie/Portals/0/EY%20CCTB.pdf.
114. Id. at 2 (claiming that the purpose of the CCCTB would be to reduce compliance costs on
cross-border taxable transactions and improve competitiveness for European businesses).
115. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Charles Duhigg, Billions in Taxes Avoided by Apple, U.S.
Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A1 (discussing the Congressional hearings held to
uncover the scope of the tax avoidance schemes employed by Apple, as well as numerous other
MNCs).
116. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 113, at 7–12 (acknowledging
gaps in domestic tax rules despite international efforts to tighten cross-border tax regimes).
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any analysis of the corporate tax structure in Ireland and its position in the
context of global tax policy, such that pressure is mounting to reform the
system on an international scale in order to best combat these current
shortcomings.117 Until such time however,118 Ireland will continue to attract
significant foreign investment from the MNCs seeking to exploit these
arbitrage opportunities.
B. BENEFITS OF THE IRISH CORPORATE TAX REGIME FOR
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
One of the most innovative recent corporate tax avoidance schemes was
centered in Ireland and utilized by a number of MNCs, such as Apple,
Google, Facebook and others. 119 Known as the Double Irish Sandwich, this
scheme was a combination of two separate mechanisms known as the
Double Irish Walkthrough and the Dutch Sandwich, and was especially
effective for technology companies deriving a majority of their revenues
from intangible intellectual property rights.120 For example, a U.S.
corporation would incorporate a subsidiary in Ireland and establish its
operations for purposes of tax residence in Bermuda. This would avail the
subsidiary of Bermuda’s zero percent corporate income tax while
simultaneously allowing for the company to exploit Ireland’s policy of not
taxing foreign profits of an Irish corporation with residence (i.e.,
operations) in another jurisdiction.121 The U.S. corporation would then
transfer some intangible intellectual property rights to this subsidiary in an
arm’s-length transaction, and although the initial transference may be
taxable, all subsequent income derived from that intellectual property
would be foreign income not subject to the U.S. corporate income tax.122
The next step in the process was the establishment of a second Irish
subsidiary to which the Bermudian subsidiary licensed the intellectual
117. See, e.g., id. at 14–25 (enumerating a 15-point Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting, including proposals to develop and implement model treaty provisions to combat tax
avoidance schemes as well as creating rules to limit corporations’ ability to transfer intangible
property rights to more favorable jurisdictions).
118. As previously mentioned, Irish government representatives have recently called for an
amendment to the corporate residency rules currently being exploited to great success with the
“Double Irish” avoidance scheme. See Ireland to Change Company Tax Laws, but 12.5%
Corporation Tax Rate to Stay, supra note 106.
119. Facebook’s utilization of the “Double Irish” resulted in an Irish corporation tax bill of
approximately €1.9 million, despite the fact that Facebook Ireland Limited, Facebook’s primary
subsidiary in the structure of this scheme, generated approximately €1.79 billion in revenues in
2012. Jamie Smyth, ‘Double Irish’ Limits Facebook’s Tax Bill to €1.9m in Ireland, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca64f938-5dc0-11e3-95bd00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nxc4VpLo.
120. Loomis, supra note 107, at 836–39.
121. Id. at 837–38 (stating it is significant to employ this structure to avail the corporation of
the numerous and advantageous tax treaties available to Ireland, which simply incorporating in
Bermuda would not provide).
122. Id.
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property rights it had acquired from the parent corporation in the United
States in exchange for “substantial royalties.”123 However, the Irish tax code
allows for generous tax deductions in connection to royalties paid out in
exchange for intellectual property that is deemed “crucial” to the Irish
company’s business.124 As such, although the second Irish subsidiary would
have to report the income derived through the use of the license obtained
from the Bermuda-resident subsidiary (taxable at the standard 12.5 percent
Irish corporate income tax rate), it would be able to deduct from that
liability the substantial royalties deductions, thereby rendering a fairly
nominal tax obligation.125 Furthermore, in certain circumstances where the
second Irish subsidiary was utilizing licensed intellectual property that was
held in a separate office abroad (e.g., the Bermudian subsidiary in the
example), it was not uncommon that the revenues derived from such
foreign-held intellectual property would be deemed “non-Irish” profits, and
thus, would not be subject to any Irish taxation.126
While this system of tax forum shopping, known as the Double Irish
Walkthrough, was oftentimes sufficient for many corporations, an
additional step known as the Dutch Sandwich (hence the overall term
Double Irish Sandwich) was employed as a third step to further reduce tax
obligations.127 The Dutch Sandwich portion was employed by creating a
third subsidiary in the Netherlands to which the Bermuda-resident Irish
subsidiary licensed its intellectual property rights instead of licensing them
directly to the second Irish subsidiary, as was the case in the Double Irish
Walkthrough.128 The Dutch subsidiary thereafter funneled the income
derived from the intellectual property license to the second Irish
subsidiary.129 This method had a dual effect: (1) it reduced the tax burden
stemming from the royalty payments made to the Bermudian subsidiary to
virtually nothing because of a peculiar provision of Dutch tax law and
European tax treaties,130 and (2) it allowed the second Irish subsidiary to
continue to avail itself of the low overall 12.5 percent Irish tax rate on its
general corporate taxable income.131 And while the Irish Double’s days

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 838–39.
See O’Brien, supra note 98.
Loomis, supra note 107, at 839.
O’Brien, supra note 98.
See Loomis, supra note 107, at 839.
Id.
Id.
Payments to the primary Irish subsidiary are subject to limited tax liability because the
“conduit” company in the Netherlands transfers the royalty payments from Irish subsidiary
number 2 to Irish subsidiary number 1 without being subject to withholding requirements for
corporate portfolio payments as exempted by the bilateral Irish and Dutch corporate tax treaties.
Int’l Monetary Fund, Taxing Times, FISCAL MONITOR, Oct. 2013, at 47, 48 available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf.
131. Loomis, supra note 107, at 839.
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appear to be numbered,132 the fierce protection of the baseline 12.5 percent
corporate tax rate along with new policy alternatives such as the proposed
“knowledge development box” tax credit indicate that Ireland will remain a
prominent destination for MNCs looking to minimize their overall tax
liability through similar schemes.133
Apple presents a prominent and highly successful “real world” example
of the Double Irish Sandwich in action.134 Beginning in the late-1980s,
Apple created two Irish subsidiaries, Apple Operations International and
Apple Sales International, to which it transferred various intellectual
property rights in order to avail itself of the lower Irish corporate tax rate on
the revenues derived from those properties.135 Apple then employed a
unique twist to the Double Irish Sandwich, in which it assigned partial
ownership of its Irish subsidiaries to a holding company in the Virgin
Islands.136 This allowed for the profits derived on the intellectual property
rights held by the Irish subsidiaries to be transferred to the Virgin Islandsbased “parent,” thus subjecting those profits to virtually no tax burden
pursuant to the Virgin Islands tax laws.137 Finally, Apple employed the
Dutch Sandwich component of the Double Irish Sandwich by funneling
additional profits derived from intellectual property held by a Dutch
subsidiary through the Netherlands and back to Ireland, thereby allowing
those profits to travel “virtually tax-free” thanks to Ireland’s participation in
European tax treaties.138 Through this and other tax avoidance schemes,
Apple was able to minimize its corporate tax burden on foreign profits to a
paltry 3.2 percent in 2011.139
Although the tax avoidance scheme employed by Apple and countless
other MNCs was seemingly flawless in its capacity to reduce a U.S.-based
corporation’s tax burden, it is important to note that any income held by
132. See, e.g., Castle & Scott, supra note 110 (describing Ireland’s closing of the corporate tax
residence loophole).
133. Id. (quoting Crawford Spence, an accounting professor at Warwick Business School in
Coventry, England: “I am skeptical as to how big a deal this [the closing of the corporate
residency loophole] really is . . . [i]n general, corporations don’t see much legitimacy in corporate
tax, and Western countries don’t appear that interested in making them pay it, either.”); see also
Puzzanghera & Dave, supra note 99 (quoting USC law professor and tax policy expert Edward
Kleinbard: “Ireland has offered up this sacrificial lamb [the Irish Double loophole] in the hopes of
preserving what’s most important to them in the long term, which is their low corporate tax
rate.”).
134. For various explanations of Apple’s corporate tax avoidance strategies, see generally
Jonathan Weil, Explaining Apple’s Irish Tax Dodge, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/explaining-apple-s-irish-tax-dodge.html; Elizabeth
MacDonald, Apple’s Irish Tax Strategy Explained, FOX BUSINESS (May 21, 2013),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2013/05/21/apples-irish-tax-strategy-explained/.
135. Duhigg, supra note 93.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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these foreign subsidiaries could not be repatriated to the U.S. parent
company without incurring substantial tax obligations on those sums.140
While there are numerous creative means by which MNCs such as Apple
and others dodged this requirement,141 several MNCs have also lobbied
Congress to implement a “repatriation tax holiday.”142 These corporations
argue that by granting a temporary tax holiday for the repatriation of
foreign-held income,143 the subsequent influx of cash held by the U.S.
parent corporations would allow for substantial domestic investment, and
would thereby boost the United States’ economy.144 Still, others argue that
the entire American corporate tax structure should be reassessed due to the
steady erosion of the corporate tax base as a result of U.S. MNCs seeking to
bolster profits by minimizing their tax exposure through methods such as
those discussed above.145
III. PROS AND CONS OF AMENDING THE CORPORATE TAX
STRUCTURE IN IRELAND
Although the decision makers in Ireland have made it abundantly clear
that the government does not intend to increase the baseline 12.5 percent
corporate tax rate,146 there continues to be a widespread debate as to
whether such a tax hike would be advisable for the purpose of combatting

140. See Loomis, supra note 107, at 839.
141. Methods such as the Killer B, Deadly D, and Outbound F are all tactics used by MNCs to

exploit loopholes in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in order to avoid the tax burden on
repatriated income. For instance, the Deadly D is a method employed to exploit 26 U.S.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(D) of the IRC. In effect, the Deadly D was employed by the parent company to
acquire a separate corporate entity, which the foreign (Irish) subsidiary then purchased with
income accumulated overseas. This had the dual advantage of allowing money to be transferred
back to the parent company while also providing for the acquisition of a new property essentially
tax free. Id. at 841.
142. See Duhigg, supra note 93.
143. Some studies estimate that more than $2 trillion is currently held by U.S.-based MNCs
overseas in order to avoid incurring tax liability upon repatriating that revenue. See Int’l Monetary
Fund, supra note 130, at 47.
144. See, e.g., Robert Puentes, Joseph Kane & Patrick Sabol, Establish a National
Infrastructure Bank Capitalized by a Repatriation Tax Holiday, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2013),
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/08/15%20repatriation%20tax/federalism
%20series%20repatriation.pdf.
145. See Dumler, supra note 104, at 93–94 (discussing the need for the regeneration of the
United States’ corporate tax base through the reduction of the current corporate tax rate in order to
increase tax revenues and rehabilitate the legitimacy of the overall tax system since individuals
and domestic businesses are currently left to fill the “revenue gap” created by the substantial
decrease in taxable corporate incomes due to the expatriation and tax avoidance schemes of U.S.based MNCs).
146. Eamon Gilmore, Ireland’s deputy prime minister and a member of the left-leaning Labour
Party, has insisted that the corporate tax rate will absolutely not be raised, even to combat the
ongoing fiscal crisis. See Pearlstein, supra note 2.
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the fiscal and sovereign debt crises in Ireland.147 Despite its previously
“favored” status within the EU, many of Ireland’s European partners have
become the most strident in their calls for reform.148 Opponents of raising
the corporate tax rate cite the potentially harmful consequences associated
with doing so, including disenfranchising the MNCs that have decided to do
business in Ireland based upon Ireland’s current corporate tax regime.149
Such individuals claim that any benefit derived from the increase in public
revenue would immediately be matched and then exceeded by the harm of
losing MNC employers to friendlier tax jurisdictions.150 However, critics of
the current corporate tax rate claim that failure to implement an increase
would be an abrogation of the government’s duty to seek out all possible
means of combating the ongoing sovereign debt crisis.151 Furthermore, they
argue that if such a policy change were to occur, the effect on MNCs based
in Ireland would be significantly less than the doomsday prophecies of
those against the tax increase.152
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING THE CURRENT
CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURE
As previously discussed, the Irish corporate tax structure has long been
an important strategic engine in attracting and maintaining FDI. However,
with the implosion of the housing and construction markets and the popping
of the property market bubble, regulators and politicians are loathe to
impose an additional tax on the one sector of the market that is not
floundering as a result of the slowdown: foreign-owned manufacturing.153
Any decision to raise the corporate tax rate in Ireland is effectively a costbenefit analysis. Opponents of raising the tax believe that while doing so
would generate the benefit of a minimal increase in tax revenue,154 the
benefit would be far outweighed by the cost of losing FDI from driving the
MNCs to friendlier tax jurisdictions.
147. For differing opinions on the policy options for Ireland with respect to the corporate tax
rate, compare Ciarán Hancock, Corporate Tax Rate of 20% Would Not Cause Exodus, Says Swiss
Pharma Chief, IRISH TIMES, June 8, 2013, at 17, with Alderman, supra note 6.
148. See generally Dillon, supra note 7.
149. See Alderman, supra note 6.
150. Id.
151. See id. (citing European partner governments as a main opponent of the Irish corporation
tax, particularly in light of the bailout package provided to Ireland and funded by the same
European partners).
152. See Hancock, supra note 147 (quoting Ricardo Braglia, CEO of a Swiss pharmaceutical
company that maintains a base in Ireland, as arguing that although a large increase to the corporate
tax rate in Ireland may have a significant negative impact on the economy, a more nominal
increase (up to 20 percent) “would probably not result in an exodus of overseas multinational
investors” because of the significant domestic investment that such companies have already made
in Ireland).
153. Alderman, supra note 6.
154. See infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text for a simplified example of the additional
tax revenue that would be generated by a nominal increase to the corporate tax law.
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When determining the importance of the current corporate tax structure
in attracting FDI from MNCs, it is almost uniformly posited that the tax rate
has vital importance to such investment goals.155 Furthermore, although the
tax rate is objectively low and subsequently attractive for foreign
corporations looking to invest abroad, “the influx of such taxes provides
huge amounts of money for Ireland relative to its comparatively small
size.”156 Advocates of maintaining the current corporate tax structure, a
group that includes a majority of the policy makers in the Oireachtas,157
embrace a fairly uniform “don’t bite the hand that feeds you” policy. Put
simply, when less than one percent of the corporate entities having tax
liability in Ireland make up nearly 70 percent of the corporate tax revenues
collected by the government, the opponents to the tax hike argue that it is
unwise to raise the corporate tax rate and risk raising the ire of such integral
corporate entities.158 Many feel that the Irish economy would never have
developed into the roaring Celtic Tiger of the pre-financial crisis years
without the advantages presented by the low corporation tax rate, and thus,
the quickest way to return to those boom years is to replicate the path taken
to reach that point.159
This consensus, most prominently shared by the policy makers within
Ireland itself, is supported by both numerical and anecdotal data alike.
Despite the low real rate of corporate tax in Ireland, the gross receipts
derived from its corporate tax policy make up a much larger portion of the
overall tax receipts of the nation when compared to Ireland’s European
counterparts.160 In fact, during some of the greatest boom years of the Celtic
Tiger era, Irish corporate tax revenues accounted for as much as 13 percent
of all tax receipts collected, whereas that same figure ranged between three
percent and seven percent in higher corporate tax jurisdictions such as the
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany during the same
period.161 These figures merely highlight that although the corporate tax rate
is comparatively low, the revenues derived are highly important to Ireland’s
155. John Walsh, Ireland’s Corporate Tax Battle, BUS. & FIN., Sept. 12, 2008, available at
http://businessandfinance.com/index.jsp?p=162&n=284&a=1152.
156. Dillon, supra note 7, at 11 n.40.
157. Taoiseach Enda Kennedy told Ireland’s national television and radio broadcaster RTÉ that
“the Government had ‘no intention’ of changing the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate.” Derek
Scally, SPD Places Irish Corporate Tax Rate at Centre of Coalition Talks, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 15,
2013, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/spd-places-irish-corporate-tax-rate-atcentre-of-coalition-talks-1.1560375.
158. Stewart, supra note 101, at 2 (citing 2008 statistics).
159. Dillon, supra note 7, at 33.
160. Stewart, supra note 101, at 3 (comparing the percentage of total tax payments derived from
corporate tax payments for countries and/or entities including Ireland, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the EU, and the OECD, such that Ireland’s percentages for
2007 and 2008 respectively amounted to 10.9 and 9.7 per cent, greater than any other country in
2007 and less than only the United Kingdom and OECD in 2008).
161. Dorgan, supra note 10, at 11 (internal citation omitted).
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economic recovery since they compose a comparatively larger portion of
the overall tax revenue.162
Given such numerical data, many claim that the corporate tax scheme is
providing more than its fair share of revenue to the public accounts.163 To
that end, some commentators argue that if Ireland were to undertake
measures to generate additional revenue in order to improve its fiscal
health, then reliance should actually be shifted away from the corporate tax
in order to emphasize more consistent means of revenue production.164 In
other words, proponents of the current system argue that any additional
revenue generated from a hike to the corporate tax would be too variable
and inconsistent to be a reliable source of fiscal stimulus.165
B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CHANGING THE CURRENT
CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURE
On the other end of the spectrum, calls for amending the Irish corporate
tax structure have become increasingly vociferous since 2008. At the most
basic level, opponents of the current system argue that “[c]orporate tax is
not and cannot be the cornerstone of industrial policy,”166 and that Ireland
must adopt “a more varied, sustainable, and internationally viable strategy
than simple reliance on [United States] multinational investment based on
tax inducements.”167 However, recent calls for such amendments also focus
on the untapped source of revenue that the Irish corporate tax base offers as
possible salvation for the beleaguered public finances.168
While proponents of the current tax scheme point to its vital role in
attracting FDI, studies have found that businesses prioritize (1) the support
a government can provide for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and (2)
the additional support it can provide for high-tech enterprises as critical
factors in considering the attractiveness of a foreign market in which to
invest over the level of corporate tax rate that said jurisdiction may
162. Stewart, supra note 101, at 3.
163. See id.
164. See Croke, supra note 19, at 386 (noting that Ireland’s current fiscal woes are due in part

to an over reliance on “cyclical revenue sources” (e.g., corporate tax, stamp duties) that too
closely adhere to the booms and busts of the business cycle, and that it would be advisable for
Irish policy makers to focus on more consistent revenue sources (e.g., an “annually levied
property tax”) as a means to both improve the current sovereign debt crisis and ensure a more
sustainable system of revenue generation in the future).
165. See id.
166. Stewart, supra note 101, at 9 (citing “telecommunications, infrastructure, logistics and a
skilled labour force” as the truly essential components to any effective industrial development
policy).
167. Dillon, supra note 7, at 18.
168. See, Alderman, supra note 6 (citing Philip R. Lane, a professor of international economics
at Trinity College Dublin, who argues that politicians are reluctant to raise the corporate tax rate,
the primary engine of the post-recession economy, despite the fact that “if the tax rate were
nudged a little higher it would help [Ireland] collect significant revenue”).
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impose.169 While this points to a minimal role that corporate tax plays in
attracting FDI, many of Ireland’s European partner governments are more
concerned with crying foul over the inequity that Ireland’s corporate tax
creates.170 While Europe spent many years indulging Ireland in its pursuit of
seemingly unfair tax competition as it simultaneously benefitted from the
prodigious EU structural and cohesion funds, European leadership is now
becoming far more critical of the Irish corporate tax regime.171
Many commentators argue that a nominal increase to the corporate tax
rate would not significantly deter MNCs from choosing to do business in
Ireland.172 If Ireland were merely to raise its corporation tax rate from 12.5
percent to 15 percent, the increase in tax receipts derived from the
corporation tax for the year 2011 would have exceeded €700 million.173 For
a nation with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 123.1 percent in 2011,174 an immediate
annual infusion of nearly three-quarters of a billion euros without any
additional fiscal policy adjustment would result in a reduction of the debtto-GDP ratio by approximately 0.35 percent.175 While such a reduction may
169. Stewart, supra note 101, at 8 (citing a 2010 study conducted by Ernst & Young, which
reported that when asked the “best way for states to stimulate future European attractiveness” with
respect to attracting FDI, 29% of respondents replied “to support small and medium sized
enterprises,” while 27% responded “[to] support high-tech industries and innovation,” while only
22% said “[to] reduce taxation and increase flexibility”).
170. Alderman, supra note 6.
171. See Dillon, supra note 7, at 37–39. Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian tax commissioner of the
EU in 2007, stated in June of that year:
[W]hen I’m speaking for the harmonisation of the tax base I’m not representing
Hungarian interest but the [European] Community interest. Mr. McCreevy [the Irish
internal market commissioner for the EU] is representing the national interest of Ireland
. . . Mr. McCreevy is no longer the minister of finance of Ireland. He used to be but
now he is [a] member of [the] European Commission who should represent the
community interests.
Id.

172. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 6 (quoting professor of international economics Philip R.
Lane as hypothesizing that a negligible “nudge” to the corporate tax rate would not have a
significant consequence).
173. OFF. OF COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR GEN., AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE
EXCHEQUER FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1ST JANUARY 2012 TO 31ST DECEMBER 2012 (2013),
available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/finacct2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2013). Corporation tax revenue generated in 2011 at the 12.5 percent rate was €3,520,193,000,
such that a 15 percent corporation tax rate would yield €4,224,231,600 in tax revenue generated. It
is significant to note that the current corporation tax revenues fall substantially short of the precrisis levels (e.g., €5,065,894,000 in 2008), such that any increased revenues realized through the
nominal increase of the effective corporate tax rate would be likely to continue to grow as the
economic recovery continues and corporate incomes rise.
174. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 5, at 7.
175. According to the OECD basic statistics of Ireland for 2012, GDP equaled €163.6 billion in
2012 and gross financial debt (i.e., debt-to-GDP ratio) equaled 123.1 percent, or €201.4 billion
(€163.6 x 123.1 percent). If the above-referenced nominal corporate tax increase from 12.5
percent to 15 percent were to be implemented tomorrow, that would result in an immediate
reduction in public debt by just over €700 million. While oversimplifying the matter, this
illustration certainly shows that while the effect of a tax increase would be minimal, it would also
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seem small in comparison to the overall scope of the sovereign debt crisis,
it remains significant in that (1) the corporate tax increase would provide an
immediate and fairly substantial infusion of public revenue, and (2) the
increased revenues would be attained from a source other than the ordinary
Irish citizen who has already endured reductions to public welfare programs
and increases to income and property taxes.176
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, amending the current corporate tax structure through a
nominal increase to the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate would be advisable
for two primary reasons: (1) increased corporate tax revenue would
immediately improve Ireland’s troubled fiscal situation;177 and (2) pursuit of
a more balanced and sustainable economic development strategy would put
Ireland on a path toward a more viable economic redevelopment.178 The
issues with centering a nation’s economic strategy on corporate tax
arbitrage and the attraction of FDI are myriad.179 As such, it would behoove
Irish policy makers to seize the current opportunity to restructure the Irish
economy at its most fundamental levels in an effort to remedy some of its
longest standing systemic issues.180
While the low corporate tax rate played an indisputable role in creating
the Celtic Tiger of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, studies with the
benefit of hindsight have found that the unilateral focus on economic
development through tax-induced foreign investment both artificially
inflated the economic statistics of those boom years181 and created an
unsustainable system of growth highly susceptible to negative external
events.182 Furthermore, the current corporate tax structure has given Ireland
be immediate and have the potential to grow even greater as corporate tax receipts rebound with
the continuing economic recovery. Id. at 6.
176. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
177. See generally DONOVAN & MURPHY, supra note 8, at 102–16.
178. Dillon, supra note 7, at 18.
179. For a prophetic look at some of these possibilities, see generally Coleman, supra note 12,
at 873–74.
180. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
181. See Honohan & Walsh, supra note 39, at 40 (discussing how MNCs take advantage of
transfer pricing rules—i.e., international taxation rules governing the transfer and sale of goods
and services, primarily intellectual property rights—such that a parent corporation may transfer an
intellectual property right to a foreign (Irish) subsidiary in a supposedly “arm’s length”
transaction, thereby allowing for all profits derived by that intellectual property to be accrued in
the assumedly lower tax burden jurisdiction, such as Ireland, and ultimately creating a
disproportionate inflation of the Irish corporation’s “profits” in that “the huge profits recorded by
the Irish affiliates have very little to do with the manufacturing activities [actually] being
conducted in Ireland”).
182. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 873–74 (noting, very presciently, that due to the highly
“globalized” nature of the Irish economy, particularly with respect to its reliance on United Statesbased FDI, Ireland would be particularly susceptible to any downturn or recession in the United
States economy).
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the reputation of a tax haven, which may detrimentally affect its ability to
attract future FDI.183
If implemented correctly, amending the corporate tax structure could
also have the parallel benefit of improving the indigenous industry of
Ireland that has, to date, lagged woefully behind its MNC-led
counterparts.184 While the history of high FDI has resulted in a generation
of highly skilled Irish employees and managers, there has not been a surge
of entrepreneurial development that one would anticipate from such a
highly qualified workforce.185 Although many former employees of MNC
giants have spun off numerous entrepreneurial ventures, the government
does not incentivize small business development by domestic entities.186 As
a result, the current pattern is such that successful Irish enterprises are
quickly snapped up by large, foreign corporations before they can reach
their full potential.187 If Irish policy makers took the opportunity to amend
the corporate tax code to include certain benefits (e.g., research and
development tax credits for domestically controlled business) and tax
breaks for Irish-owned and developed companies, the result could be such
that the long-suffering domestic industry would have an opportunity to
develop into the “more varied, sustainable, and internationally viable”188
source of growth needed to rehabilitate the Celtic Tiger.189
Ultimately, although economic indicators show that Ireland is now
finally beginning to turn a corner on its road to recovery,190 it is clear that
significant systemic changes still need to be explored and implemented in
183. See Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 115 (discussing the Congressional investigation of
Apple’s use of the Irish corporate tax loopholes and the subsequent public relations backlash
against the current taxation scheme).
184. See Pearlstein, supra note 2.
185. See Stewart, supra note 101, at 9.
186. An OECD survey of the Irish economy attributes the limitation on entrepreneurial
endeavors in large part to limited financing available for startup companies to progress from
“[research and development] to commercialization” and enumerates both public and private
financing alternative solutions to help alleviate this issue. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., supra note 5, at 28–29.
187. For further exploration of the social and political factors influencing this normal pattern of
Irish industrial development, see Pearlstein, supra note 2, discussing the traditional societal
emphasis on landing a “permanent and pensionable” career, such that Irish workers are
discouraged from starting their own businesses. Furthermore, for the limited percentage of the
population that does choose to pursue the startup route, those individuals most often sell out at the
earliest signs of success, thus securing their future without subjecting themselves to the myriad
complexities of taking a company public. The pattern is further exacerbated by institutional
factors such as the Irish tax code, “which imposes relatively high taxes on incomes of the selfemployed (55 percent) and capital gains (33 percent) but infamously low taxes (12.5 percent) on
the profits . . . of corporations.” Id.
188. Dillon, supra note 7, at 18.
189. It is significant to note that the global export economy—funded primarily by the large
MNCs that make up the subject matter of this Note—has already begun a significant recovery, as
new FDI has ascended to record levels over the past few years. Pearlstein, supra note 2.
190. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 84.
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order to prevent future economic actors from committing the same
mistakes.191 A nominal increase to the corporate tax rate would provide an
intriguing opportunity to both reshape Ireland’s future fiscal policy while
also providing a substantial boost to the government coffers. The
opportunity is there, and global economists may be discussing in ten years’
time how, out of the ashes of the Celtic Tiger, the Celtic Phoenix rose up to
restore the international economic prominence of the Emerald Isle.
Andrew P. Kummer*

191. For a discussion and non-exclusive list of proposed policy options, see generally Croke,
supra note 19, at 382–89.
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